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ABSTRACT
COVID-19 has impacted almost every facet of our lives, but has it impacted
intellectual property rights? Possibly. This article explores the intersection between
the work-made-for-hire doctrine under the Copyright Act of 1976, agency theory, the
updated Restatement (Third) of Agency, and our changing workforce in a postCOVID-19 world. Specifically, as of now, whether an employee was “in the scope of
employment” at the time a work was created is evaluated, in part, by whether the
work occurred “substantially within time and space limits.” But this test is derived
from the Restatement (Second) of Agency, which has been amended, and the
Restatement (Third) no longer includes this as a factor. On top of the changing
Restatement, employment conditions for many in this country have also changed
dramatically. Now, where home is not only where the heart is but where the office is,
this raises complex issues about whether the test for scope of employment should
change and discusses the implications of such a change.
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THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT TEST UNDER THE WORK-MADE-FOR-HIRE
DOCTRINE REVISITED: HOW COVID-19, REMOTE WORKING, AND THE
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY COULD CHANGE IT
DIANA J. SIMON*
Our country has changed in fundamental ways since COVID-19 hit in March
of 2020. In what seemed like an instant, we were all sent home to work (except, of
course, our essential workers in healthcare and elsewhere), and many of us stayed
home for months on end. In the meantime, copyright law, which did not come to a
standstill during COVID-19, still evaluates whether an employee’s work is within the
scope of employment by assessing, in part, whether the work occurred “substantially
within the authorized time and space limits.”1 But this test is derived from section 228
of the Restatement (Second) of Agency, a section that has since been supplanted by
section 7.07 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency, which has abandoned this factor.
Thus, this article discusses whether this factor should be abandoned in favor of an
approach that recognizes the realities of our new remote workforce and the more recent
Restatement provision.
This article approaches the issue above in seven parts. Part I briefly traces the
genesis of how copyright law became intertwined with agency law. Part II focuses on
the current state of the test for whether an employee was within the scope of
employment when preparing a work. Part III focuses on the differences between the
purposes underlying copyright law, on the one hand, and agency law for tort purposes,
on the other hand. Part IV traces how the Restatement (Third) of Agency appeared in
copyright law and addresses the changes to the relevant section of the Restatement
and the reasons behind those. Part V discusses the changes in our workforce since
COVID-19, some of which may become permanent. Part VI addresses how courts have
addressed changes in Restatements after the adoption of aspects of them. Parts VII
and VIII conclude with a discussion of whether the test for scope of employment should
change based on both the updating of the Restatement and changes in our workforce
looking at how such a change would impact both employers and employees.

* Associate Professor of Legal Writing & Assistant Clinical Professor of Law, the University of
Arizona, James E. Rogers College of Law. Prior to becoming a full-time professor of legal writing, I
specialized in litigation involving copyright and trademark issues. Now, as part of my official duties
at the law school, I am charged with the responsibility of drafting hypothetical problems for our firstyear students to write about. I have chosen many copyright issues over the years based on my past
experiences handling those issues. In fact, one of the problems I recently researched and drafted
inspired me to write this article. I referenced the hypothetical problem and why I chose it for the
students in another article I wrote about my approach in creating those problems. See Diana J. Simon,
Focused and Fun: A How-to Guide for Creating Hypotheticals for Law Students, 19 SCRIBES J. LEGAL
WRITING 161, 178–79 (2020). I am grateful to Ezekiel Peterson for his citation assistance. The views
expressed herein are mine alone and do not represent the views of anyone at Arizona Law.
1 E.g., U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. v. Parts Geek, LLC, 692 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2012)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of AGENCY, § 228 (AM. L. INST. 1958) (amended 2006)).
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I. THE STORY OF HOW THE WORK-MADE-FOR-HIRE DOCTRINE BECAME ENTWINED WITH
THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
Under the Copyright Act (“the Act”), the copyright in a work “vests initially in
the author or authors of the work.”2 The Act, however, carves out an exception for
“works made for hire.”3 Under section 201(b) of the Act, if the work is one made for
hire, “the employer or other person for whom the work was prepared is considered the
author for purposes of this title, . . . and . . . owns all of the rights comprised in the
copyright.”4 The Act, however, does not further define work for hire or otherwise
provide guidance on the subject. The Supreme Court, however, tackled the issue in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid (“CCNV”).5 There, the Court, after noting
that the terms “employee” and “scope of employment” are nowhere defined in the Act
itself, determined that Congress intended to use these terms as understood by
“common-law agency doctrine.”6 It then turned to section 220 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency (among other authorities), which sets forth a non-exhaustive list of
factors relevant to determine whether a hired party is an employee.7 Based on these
factors, because the Supreme Court determined that the party was not an employee
but an independent contractor, the Court did not determine whether the work was
prepared within the scope of employment.8
Subsequently, the Fourth Circuit, taking its direction from the Supreme Court,
applied the Restatement (Second) of Agency in analyzing whether a party,
indisputably an employee, created a work within the scope of thier employment.9
Based on CCNV, the court turned to section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency
and laid out the three-part test from that section as follows: A servant’s conduct is
within the scope of employment if: “(a) it is of the kind he is employed to perform; (b)
it occurs substantially within the authorized time and space limits; [and] (c) it is
actuated, at least in part, by a purpose to serve the master.”10 Other circuits then
followed suit.11 Thus, the Copyright Act, and the work-for-hire doctrine became
enmeshed with the common-law agency doctrine and the Restatement (Second) of
Agency.

17 U.S.C. § 201 (a) (2021).
17 U.S.C. § 201 (b) (2021).
4 Id.
5 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
6 Id. at 740.
7 Id. at 753.
8 Id.
9 Avtec Sys. Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994). While this was the first court of
appeals to adopt this test, lower district courts did so in the five years between the decisions in CCNV
and Avtec. E.g., Miller v. CP Chems., Inc., 808 F. Supp. 1238, 1243 (D.S.C. 1992) (“this court finds
that the general common law of agency would also be relevant to the analysis of the term ‘within the
scope of employment.’”).
10 Avtec, 21 F.3d at 571 (quoting the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of AGENCY, § 228 (1958)).
11 Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2004); U.S. Auto
Parts Network, Inc. v. Parts Geek, LLC, 692 F.3d 1009, 1015 (9th Cir. 2012); TD Bank N.A. v. Hill,
928 F.3d 259, 276–77 (3d Cir. 2019).
2
3
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II. THE RESTATEMENT’S SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT THREE-PART TEST: HOW COURTS HAVE
INTERPRETED IT
While some commentators and courts alike have characterized the three-part
test above as rules that are either “not rigid”12 or just factors, none of which are
dispositive,13 the courts have not been uniform in this approach. First, the test itself is
worded in the conjunctive, as opposed to the disjunctive, which could be why courts
have stated that the test is conjunctive requiring that all three prongs must be
satisfied.14 Second, some courts refer to the prongs as “elements,”15 and elements, as
opposed to factors, are “a component of a legal test that must be proved . . . and [a]s
constituent parts, all of the elements . . . must be proved to establish the legal claim in
question.”16 Third, on the time and space factor, some courts have held that the work
was not for hire because the employee did the work at home during off hours, and thus,
the employer “failed to meet its burden of proof” on the second prong.17 For example,
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, after stressing that the
employer must demonstrate all three factors to prove a work is one for hire, held that
the computer program at issue was not created within time and spatial bounds because
the employee spent 3,000 hours outside of normal hours working on it, even though he
did test each module at work.18 Similarly, when a police officer created a workbook and
training manual at home during off hours, the court held that the defendant employer
utterly failed to meet its burden of proof that the employee used authorized hours to
create the work.19
Nonetheless, several courts have said that the second factor—time and space
limits—is given less weight assuming the work was the kind the employee was hired
to perform,20 or have found that the factor was satisfied even though the work was
done at home or during off hours. For example, the Fourth Circuit held that the source
code an employee created was within authorized space limits even though it was
created at home because there was no strict differentiation between “work and home,

12 Robert A. Kreiss, Scope of Employment and Being an Employee Under the Work-Made-For-Hire
Provision of the Copyright Law: Applying the Common-Law Agency Tests, 40 U. KAN. L. REV. 119, 128
(1991).
13 Kurakyn Holdings, LLC v. Ciro, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 3d 789, 804 (W.D. Wis. 2016).
14 Woodson v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., No. 19-14572, 2020 WL 1329918, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 23,
2020); Quinn v. City of Detroit, 988 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (E.D. Mich. 1997); City of Newark v. Beasley,
883 F. Supp. 3, 7–8 (D.N.J. 1995) (noting that “the [employer] must prove all three elements set forth
in the Restatement” because the test is worded in the conjunctive); Roeslin v. Dist. of Columbia, 921
F. Supp. 793, 798 (D.D.C. 1995). Interestingly, in the context of determining vicarious liability using
these same three factors in a tort case, several courts have also held that all three criteria must be
met. E.g., Bagent v. Blessing Care Corp., 862 N.E.2d 985, 992 (Ill. 2007); Grager v. Schudar, 770
N.W.2d 692, 699 (N.D. 2009) (observing that the scope of employment determination requires
consideration of each element in section 228).
15 Avtec, 21 F.3d at 571; Kurakyn Holdings, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 3d at 804.
16 Michael R. Smith, Elements v. Factors, 39 WYO. LAW. 46, 46 (2016).
17 Beasley, 883 F. Supp. at 8.
18 Roeslin, 921 F. Supp. at 798.
19 Beasley, 883 F. Supp. at 8.
20 E.g., Avtec, 21 F.3d at 571; see also TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 277 (3d Cir. 2019)
(“Although the test is phrased in the conjunctive, meaning all three factors must be
satisfied . . . courts must consider time and spatial bounds with care.”).
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or between work hours and off hours.”21 Similarly, the Second Circuit held that work
done at home was still within authorized bounds because the “very nature of a
teacher’s duties involves a substantial amount of time outside of class.”22
The reasoning behind giving less weight to the time and space factor in an
increasingly mobile society, was well articulated by the Third Circuit in 2019 as
follows:
This factor is most probative for employees who work shifts or
otherwise have regular hours and definite workplaces . . . . In our
increasingly mobile work culture, however, many executives and
professionals—for better or worse—lack obvious temporal or spatial
boundaries for their work . . . . For such employees, the second factor
will illuminate little, and a fact-finder cannot indulge in the fiction of
a 9-to-5 workday. On the other hand, even when an employee’s position
has ascertainable temporal and spatial boundaries, her unilateral
decision to continue working at home or beyond normal hours has little
bearing if a copyrighted work is clearly “of the kind” that the employee
was hired to create. 23
Thus, some courts have recognized that because times have changed (certainly
since 1958, when the Second Restatement of Agency was published, and even since the
Supreme Court’s reference to the Restatement (Second) of Agency in CCNV in 1989),
this factor should not carry the same weight as the others.
III. COPYRIGHT LAW AND AGENCY LAW: PURPOSES AND GOALS
While it made sense for the Supreme Court to turn to agency law in
interpreting the phrase “scope of employment,” it seems implausible that the drafters
of the Restatement (Second) of Agency had copyright law in mind when they drafted
it.24 Because these areas of the law arose in two different contexts, both should be
looked at in analyzing whether federal courts should incorporate updates in the
Restatement of Agency when ruling on matters involving works made for hire.
Broadly speaking, the main purpose of copyright law is to incentivize authors
to create culturally valuable works by giving authors exclusive rights in them for a
limited duration.25 In fact, protection of intellectual property as a goal in America goes
back to the adoption of the Constitution, which expressly authorized Congress to
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
U.S. Auto Parts Network, Inc. v. Parts Geek, LLC, 692 F.3d 1009, 1018 (9th Cir. 2012).
Shaul v. Cherry Valley-Springfield Cent. Sch. Dist., 363 F.3d 177, 186 (2d Cir. 2004).
23 TD Bank, N.A., 928 F.3d at 277.
24 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (amended 1976). One piece of evidence
supporting this is timing alone. The 1909 Copyright Act’s entire work made for hire doctrine consisted
of a single line: “[T]he word ‘author’ shall include an employer in the case of works made for hire.”
Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 254 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982)). The
Restatement (Second) of Agency was published in 1958, and it was not until 1976 that the drafters of
the Copyright Act wrote a more definitive statement on the work made for hire doctrine.
25 Jeanne C. Fromer, An Information Theory of Copyright Law, 64 EMORY L.J. 71, 74 (2014).
21
22
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Authors and Investors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.”26
More specifically, the work-made-for-hire provision in the 1976 Act had several
goals: it sought to codify and clarify existing law under the doctrine, and it made a
clear distinction between employer-employee relationships and those involving
independent contractors.27 In the employment setting, it usually will be an employee
who creates a work, but the employer, for its part, may have largely supported the
creation of that work through the investment of valuable resources and thus wants to
claim ownership of it.28 Congress, through the 1976 Act, sought to create a compromise
between the interests of employers and the actual creators of the various copyrightable
works.29 In fact, the definition of a work made for hire “‘reflects a carefully worked out
compromise’ between the artistic guilds, whose members disfavored the work-for-hire
doctrine because of their lesser bargaining power, and the major publishers, studios,
and record labels, which supported a broader work-for-hire doctrine to facilitate the
acquisition of rights.”30
In the typical dispute involving a potential work made for hire, the dispute is
between the employer and the employee.31 Because ownership in valuable intellectual
property is at stake, the employee has every incentive to argue that the work was not
created within the scope of employment at the time.32
In contrast, because the scope of employment issue under agency law serves a
different function in assessing liability of employers for the acts of their employees, vis
a vis injured third parties, an employee is incentivized to argue the opposite: that the
employee was within the scope of employment at the time.33
Broadly speaking, the law of agency is significant and intellectually distinctive
because of its “focus on relationships in which one person, as a representative of
another, has derivative authority and a duty as a fiduciary to account for the use made
of the representative position.”34 Agency law touches on a broad range of topics and,
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
CCNV v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 749 (1989); James B. Wadley & JoLynn M. Brown, Protecting
Intellectual Property Rights in the Workplace, 68 J. KAN. B.A. 28, 28 (Sept. 1999).
28 Wadley & Brown, supra note 27, at 28.
29 Id.
30 TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 272 (3d Cir. 2019) (quoting CCNV, 490 U.S. 730, 745–48
& n.11-14 (1989)).
31 See, e.g., Avtec Sys. Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 569 (4th Cir. 1994) (describing the dispute
between a space-related computer services company and its employee); TD Bank, 928 F.3d at 265
(describing the dispute between a bank and its former CEO).
32 E.g., TD Bank, 928 F.3d at 267 (involving ownership of a book that became available on Amazon
and was publicized through interviews with Jim Cramer, the host of Mad Money on CNBC); Pavlica
v. Behr, 397 F. Supp. 2d 519, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (involving a teacher who argued he created a manual
without any direction or input from his employer).
33 Kreiss, supra note 12, at 129–30.
34 Deborah A. DeMott, A Revised Prospectus for a Third Restatement of Agency, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 1035, 1037 (1998). DeMott’s conclusions about the significance of agency law should be given
great weight inasmuch as she is listed as the Chief Reporter of the Restatement (Third) of Agency
published in 2006, eight years after she wrote this article addressing the need for a third restatement
to identify critical issues not addressed in the Second Restatement or matters that should be deleted
or truncated due to developments after 1958, the publication date of the Second Restatement. Michael
Traynor, The First Restatements and the Vision of the American Law Institute, Then and Now, 32 S.
ILL. U. L.J. 145, 145, 159 (2007).
26
27
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while it is a separate body of law from either tort or contract law, it impacts and
addresses both areas.35 For example, as a consequence of agency, if an agent acts with
actual or apparent authority, the principal is bound to contracts entered into by the
agent.36 Similarly, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer or principal
is vicariously liable for the employee’s or agent’s wrongful acts committed within the
scope of the employment or agency.37
Vicarious liability is assessed, in part, with the help of section 228 of the
Second Restatement, the same section circuit courts have cited in addressing whether
a work is one made for hire under copyright law.38 Thus, in actions involving an injured
plaintiff against an employer and its employee for negligence, courts have evaluated,
among other factors, whether the employee’s conduct occurred “substantially within
the authorized time and space limits” a factor contained in section 228 (b) of the Second
Restatement of Agency.39
In assessing this and other factors, courts justify vicarious liability based on
three policy reasons: (1) it prevents recurrence of the tortious conduct; (2) it gives
greater assurance of compensation for the victim; and (3) it ensures that the victim’s
losses will be equitably borne by the those who benefit from the enterprise that gave
rise to the injury.40
Thus, the parties on opposite sides of the ring are different for tort liability, on
the one hand, and copyright ownership disputes, on the other hand. In a case involving
vicarious liability, an injured party is suing an employer and/or an employee, while in
a copyright dispute involving a work for hire, the employer and employee are suing
each other. In a case involving vicarious liability, the employee is motivated to argue
that the event was with within the scope of employment (so that the costs and damages
can be borne by the employer with the deeper pocket) while the employee is motivated
to argue the opposite in a work for hire dispute (so the employee can then claim
ownership of the copyright). Yet another difference is the policies underlying the
different claims. In a claim involving vicarious liability, a court may be motivated to
impose liability upon an employer so that an injured victim can be compensated, and
the cost will be borne by a party most able to bear it. In contrast, in a case involving a
work for hire dispute, if the law was intended to strike a compromise between the
rights of both sides, then the scales of justice would seem to be weighted more equally.

DeMott, supra note 34, at 1038.
Id.
37 E.g., Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, 280 P.3d 599, 601 (Ariz. 2012); Hass v. Wentzlaff, 816
N.W.2d 96, 102–03 (S.D. 2012).
38 Hass, 816 N.W.2d at 103 n.3 (“Restatement (Second) of Agency has played a prevalent role in
our vicarious liability jurisprudence as we often look to it for guidance.”).
39 E.g., Spencer v. VIP, Inc., 910 A.2d 366, 367–68 (Me. 2006) (determining that the employee’s
travel occurred substantially within authorized time and space limits and thus there was a genuine
issue of fact whether the travel was within the scope of the employee’s employment, reversing the
summary judgment entered in favor of the employer); Carter v. Reynolds, 815 A.2d 460, 465 (N.J.
2003) (citing section 228 of the Restatement in analyzing whether an action was within the scope of
the employee’s employment).
40 Farmers Ins. Group v. Cnty. of Santa Clara, 906 P.2d 440, 454–55 (Cal. 1995); see Rhett B.
Franklin, Pouring New Wine into an Old Bottle: A Recommendation for Determining Liability of an
Employer Under Respondeat Superior, 39 S.D. L. REV. 570, 574–77 (1994).
35
36
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Therefore, while the wording of the factor is the exact same in both the tort
and copyright scenarios, the alignment of the parties, and their motivations and
interests, are different.
IV. IN 2019, THE THIRD CIRCUIT, IN A COPYRIGHT CASE INVOLVING A WORK-FOR-HIRE
ISSUE, FIRST REFERENCES THE THIRD RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY, PUBLISHED IN 2006.
A. TD Bank
The Third Restatement first entered the copyright scene in 2019, but it did not
make a big splash—it was a fleeting reference indirectly supporting the court’s
position.41 There, a bank sued its former chief executive officer alleging that a portion
of a book he published and marketed after leaving the bank infringed on an earlier
manuscript the CEO wrote while working at the bank using bank resources.42 The trial
court had entered summary judgment in favor of the bank, holding that the initial
manuscript was a work made for hire based upon a letter agreement signed by the
parties.43 On appeal, the court disagreed that the letter agreement itself vested
exclusive ownership with the bank, explaining that for an employee’s work to receive
work-for-hire treatment, the work must actually come within the scope of
employment.44
Addressing whether the earlier transcript fell within the scope of the CEO’s
employment, the court said the issue was one of first impression in the Third Circuit.45
It explained that “taking their cue from CCNV, other Courts of Appeals have concluded
that a work falls within the scope of employment only if” it meets the three prongs
contained in section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency.46 It then agreed with
its sister circuits that the Second Restatement’s test should be adopted, with one
further explication: “courts must consider time and spatial bounds with care.”47 In
support of this, the court quoted comment b to section 7.07 of the Third Restatement
of Agency to support abandonment of this factor because it “does not naturally
encompass the working circumstances of many managerial and professional
employees.”48 It then explained that this second factor on time and space will
“illuminate little.”49
Unfortunately, because the district court had not applied the scope of
employment test below, the court of appeals had no option but to remand the case so
that the trier of fact could resolve the underlying issues if the parties “wish[ed] to open

TD Bank N.A. v. Hill, 928 F.3d 259, 277 (3d Cir. 2019).
Id. at 265–66.
43 Id. at 267.
44 Id. at 272. Specifically, the Third Circuit stated that the district court confused an original
vesting of ownership under the work-for-hire doctrine with a transfer of ownership rights through an
assignment.
45 Id. at 276.
46 TD Bank, 928 F.3d at 277.
47 Id.
48 Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. b (AM. L. INST. 2006)).
49 Id. See infra p. 222 and note 23.
41
42
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yet another chapter in this litigation.”50 It would appear the parties did not wish to do
so because no other developments in this case have been reported.
After the Third Circuit referenced the Third Restatement of Agency, the
floodgates did not open with parties urging courts to adopt the Third Restatement and
thus totally abandon the second space and time factor. Although, in the litigation time
zone, where things move at a snail’s pace, not much time has passed since the decision
was issued in 2019. Still, one district court within the Third Circuit had the
opportunity to fall in line with the Third Restatement and abandon the time and space
factor after TD Bank if it wanted to, but it did not.
In 2020, the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey granted
an employer’s motion to dismiss a complaint for copyright infringement because the
allegations of the complaint established that the work was a work for hire and was
barred by the statute of limitations.51 In laying out the work for hire test, not only did
the court omit any reference to the Third Restatement, it reverted back to the idea that
the test is a three-part test enumerated in the Second Restatement, listed in the
conjunctive, and requiring the defendant to prove all three parts.52 In fact, although
the court cited TD Bank as indirect support for the work for hire doctrine in general,
it did not cite the case in support of the three-part test but instead relied upon an
earlier district court decision handed down in 1995.53
B. The Restatement (Third) of Agency, Section 7.07
The Third Restatement substantially changes the three-part test for scope of
employment contained in section 228 of the Second Restatement. A side-by-side
comparison of the relevant wording makes this apparent:
Section 228 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency

Section 7.07 (2) of the Restatement
(Third) of Agency

Conduct of a servant is within the scope
of employment, if, but only if:
it is of the kind he is employed to
perform;
it occurs substantially within the
authorized time and space limits;
it is actuated, at least in part, by a
purpose to serve the master, and . . .
(2) Conduct of a servant is not within
the scope of employment if it is different in
kind from that authorized, far beyond the
authorized time and space limits, or too little
actuated by a purpose to serve the master.

(2) An employee acts within the scope of
employment when performing work assigned
by the employer or engaging in a course of
conduct subject to the employer’s control. An
employee’s act is not within the scope of
employment when it occurs within an
independent course of conduct not intended
by the employee to serve any purpose of the
employer.

50
51

2020).

Id.
Woodson v. Atlantic City Bd. of Educ., No. 19-14572, 2020 WL 1329918, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 23,

Id. at *5.
Id. at *5–6 (citing City of Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. Supp. 3, 7 (D.N.J. 1995), as amended (May
5, 1995)).
52
53
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Comment b to section 7.07 discusses the rationale for the formulation of
subsection (2) and explains its relationship with its counterparts in section 228 and in
cases.54 That comment explains that the formulation of section 7.07 differs from the
formulation in sections 228 and other sections because “it is phrased in more general
terms.”55 Specifically, elimination of the time and space provision was rationalized
because the factor does not make sense based on the contemporary workforce:
This formulation [looking at authorized time and space limits] does not
naturally encompass the working circumstances of many managerial
and professional employees and others whose work is not so readily
cabined by temporal or spatial limitations. Many employees in
contemporary workforces interact on an employer’s behalf with third
parties although the employee is neither situated on the employer’s
premises nor continuously or exclusively engaged in performing
assigned work.56
Thus, there is no doubt that the authors of the Restatement have now
eliminated a factor that courts have relied upon in varying degrees for the last quarter
of a century57 in determining scope of employment for copyright purposes.
V. THE POST-COVID-19 WORKFORCE: THE DEATH KNELL TO 9-TO-5 IN AN OFFICE
ENVIRONMENT
When the drafters of the comments to the Third Restatement of Agency
referenced the conditions of “contemporary workforces” in 2006,58 they never could
have envisioned the seismic changes to our workforce in 2020 when the pandemic hit.
Many believe COVID-19 has changed the workforce “permanently.”59 While estimates
vary on how many employees are currently working from home, the numbers are
significant. Estimates suggest that by April of 2020, 62 percent of employed Americans
worked at home compared with just 25 percent in 2018.60 In a survey conducted in

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07 cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 2006).
Id. cmt. b.
56 Id.
57 Avtec Sys. Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 571 (4th Cir. 1994).
58 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.07, cmt. b.
59 E.g., Falon Fatemi, 3 Ways Covid-19 Will Permanently Change the Future of Work, FORBES
(June
3,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/falonfatemi/2020/06/03/3-ways-covid-19-willpermanently-change-the-future-of-work/; Coronavirus: How the world of work may change forever,
BBC (Oct. 23, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/worklife/article/20201023-coronavirus-how-will-thepandemic-change-the-way-we-work [hereinafter Coronavirus].
60 Brodie Boland et al., Reimagining the office and work life after Covid-19, MCKINSEY & CO.
(June 8, 2020), http;//www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/organization/our-insights/reimaginingthe-office-and-work-life-after-covid-19. Obviously, however, people who are able to work from home
tend to be privileged and have high incomes, and the new remote life leaves out the six in 10 American
workers who cannot work from home. See Claire Cain Miller, The Office Will Never Be the Same, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/20/style/office-culture.html.
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April and May, the finding was that about half are working from home.61 In fact, more
than half of the entire global workforce is working remotely.62
And most employees enjoy working from home. According to McKinsey
research, 80 percent of people report they “enjoy working from home.”63 In another
survey conducted by Morning Consult for the New York Times, which polled 1,123
people representing a range of jobs and income levels of America’s remote workers, 86
percent said they were satisfied with remote work.64 In fact, only one in five said that
they wanted to go back full-time.65 And in a more targeted study of 4,700 employees of
Slack, a business communication platform, the majority said they never wanted to go
back to the office as their workplace. Only 12% wanted to go back full-time, and 72%
wanted to work in a hybrid remote-office model.66
In fact, working remotely appears to be a trend that will continue well into
2021. One forecaster estimated that 25-30% of the workforce will be working from
home multiple days a week by the end of 2021.67 Another researcher from Gartner, a
leading research and advisory company, found that nearly 75% of chief financial
officers expect to transition a number of previously on-premises employees to remote
work setups permanently in the aftermath of COVID-19 primarily driven by desire to
cut commercial real estate costs.68
Indeed, the news has been full of announcements from larger companies that
are now dispensing with historical preferences for in-office work and embracing remote
work indefinitely.69 For example, in July of 2020, following similar announcements by
Twitter, Square, and Facebook, Google announced that it would allow its 200,000
61 Gil
Press, The Future of Work Post-Covid-19, FORBES (July 15, 2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2020/07/15/the-future-of-work-post-covid-19/.
62 Fatemi, supra note 59.
63 Boland et al., supra note 60.
64 Miller, supra note 60.
65 Id. As the pandemic has dragged on, though, that rosy picture has changed because, as the
condition becomes more permanent, it has impacted workers’ mental health, and it has been difficult
for working mothers, who are trying to supervise children who are in a remote learning situation.
Fatemi, supra note 59. According to a remote work report done in 2019, even before the pandemic,
19% of remote workers experienced loneliness, and another study done by Mind Share Partners found
that more than 60% of workers say their mental health affects their productivity. One professor of
psychology also referred to the fact that the pandemic came in the middle “of a loneliness epidemic
among the 20-somethings for the better part of the last two decades, and the remote work is a
particular problem for young new graduates moving to a new city on their first job.” In addition to
mental health concerns, gender equality issues have also worsened with the pandemic. According to
one study, women were 1.8 times more likely to lose their jobs than men because of the pandemic.
Further, the pandemic has worsened the divide between those who have good bandwidth connectivity
and those that do not because for those that do not, they are struggling or out of work, leading to
growing social and income inequality. These considerations are beyond the scope of this article, but
they are real and troubling.
66 Coronavirus, supra note 59.
67 Work-At-Home
After Covid-19—Our Forecast, GLOBAL WORKPLACE ANALYTICS,
https://globalworkplaceanalytics.com/work-at-home-after-covid-19-our-forecast (last accessed Nov.
26, 2020).
68 Fatemi, supra note 59.
69 Jack Kelly, Zillow Joins The Growing Ranks of Companies Offering Employees the Option of
Working
Remotely
‘Indefinitely,’
FORBES
(Aug.
4,
2020),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/jackkelly/2020/08/04/zillow-joins-the-growing-ranks-of-companiesoffering-employees-the-option-of-working-remotely-indefinitely/.
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employees the option to continue to work from home until at least June 2021.70
Further, Zillow announced in August of 2020 that it was going to offer about 90% of its
5,400 employees to work from home as an ongoing option.71 In fact, a wide array of
companies, including Shopify, Coinbase, Upwork, Lambda Schools, Box, Microsoft,
Morgan Stanley, JPMorgan, Amazon, PayPal, Slack and others have extended their
remote and work-from-home options.72 While most companies have set some type of
parameters, Twitter and Square, through their CEO, have said they are open to having
employees work from home “forever.”73 In addition, the chief economist for LinkedIn
has stated that LinkedIn, which has a job listings feature, has seen four times the
number of job listings that offer remote work since March globally and the same trend
from jobseekers: the volume of job searches using the “remote” filter on LinkedIn has
increased approximately 50% since the beginning of March, and the share of remote
job applications has increased nearly 2.5 times globally since March.74
Companies also are thinking about how to provide resources for employees
working at home—which certainly could factor into disputes arising about who owns
work created at home. The most obvious form of support is a remote office budget.75
Shopify, a software services company that helps customers create shopping websites,
is one example of a company that has offered its employees a $1,000 stipend to
purchase office equipment to help ease the transition to remote work.76 However, in
one survey of almost 300 organizations in North America employing 4.4 million
employees, only one in 10 employers have taken actions to offer employees subsidies
to manage the costs of working remotely.77
In sum, therefore, where and when employees work, in terms of time and
spatial boundaries, has experienced a massive shift. The issue, then, is whether that
shift, combined with the elimination of this consideration in the Restatement (Third)
of Agency, means that courts should expressly eliminate this factor when assessing
whether a work was created within the scope of employment.
VI. WHETHER A COURT WOULD ADOPT THE UPDATED RESTATEMENT IN A CASE INVOLVING
A WORK-FOR-HIRE ISSUE INSTEAD OF THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY: A
PATCHWORK OF APPROACHES
While it would be foolish to predict what a court would hold if a party in a
copyright lawsuit requested it to apply the Third Restatement instead of the Second

70 Id. See also Rob Copeland & Peter Grant, Google to Keep Employees Home Until Summer 2021
Amid Coronavirus Pandemic, WALL ST. J. (July 27, 2020), http;//www.wsj.com/articles/google-to-keepemployees-home-until-summer-2021-amid-coronavirus-pandemic-11595854201.
71 Kelly, supra note 69.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 Fatemi, supra note 59.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Actions
to Restore Stability Survey, WILLIS TOWERS WATSON (Aug. 3, 2020),
https://www.willistowerswatson.com/en-US/Insights/2020/07/actions-to-restore-stability-survey.
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Restatement, because the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior,78 it is
helpful to see how courts have behaved in the past under similar circumstances.79
Before launching into the cases, however, a brief review of what restatements
are is in order. Restatements are “a series of treatises that articulate the principles or
rules for a specific area of law.”80 They are secondary sources of law written and
published by the American Law Institute to clarify the law.81 As such, they are only a
source of persuasive authority unless courts adopt them, which would then make such
provisions mandatory authority.82
The American Law Institute is a private, independent, nonprofit
organization.83 Its membership consists of eminent judges, lawyers, and law professors
from all areas of the United States and from many foreign countries.84 It has completed
Restatements in many areas including, without limitation, Torts, Agency, Conflict of
Laws, Contracts, Employment Law, The Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
Judgments, Property, Restitution and Unjust Enrichment, Trusts, Products Liability,
and Unfair Competition.85
Interestingly, there currently is no Restatement devoted to copyright law. In
fact, in 2014, one commentator devoted an article to making the point that one should
be created, opining as follows:
To untangle the practical applications of the work for hire doctrine, one
would need to look at court opinions to chart the ways in which the
work for hire doctrine has functioned or led to disputes under a variety
of factual situations. Consultation with an interpretative guide such as
a treatise or Restatement could be an efficient way to parse this out, at
least initially. If the guide was accurate, straightforward, and
comprehensive, using it would be a smart and productive first step.
Unfortunately, no such guide exists.86

78 This saying has been attributed to everyone from psychologists, such as Albert Ellis, Walter
Michel, and B.F. Skinner, to writers such as Mark Twain, and more recently, to Dr. Phil. Joshua
Wood, The Best Predictor of Future Behaviour is Past Behaviour, Except . . ., LINKEDIN (Feb. 25, 2017),
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/best-predictor-future-behaviour-past-except-joshua-wood.
79 The author readily acknowledges that while using other examples are useful to see the range
of responses courts have had, such examples are limited in their ability to provide proof as to what
would happen with an issue involving a work for hire because the cases addressed below involve
different judges, different courts, different issues, different parts of the Restatement, and different
facts.
80 Restatement
of
the
Law,
LEGAL
INFO.
INST.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/restatement_of_the_law#:_:text=Restatements (last visited Dec. 4,
2020).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Frequently Asked Questions, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/about-ali/faq/ (last visited Dec. 4,
2020).
84 Membership, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/members/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2020).
85 Shop ALI Publications, AM. L. INST., https://www.ali.org/publications/#publication-typerestatements (last visited Dec. 4, 2020).
86 Ann Bartow, A Restatement of Copyright Law as More Independent and Stable Treatise, 79
BROOK. L. REV. 457, 460–61 (2014).
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Though such a guide does not exist, it is in the works.87 According to the
American Law Institute’s website, several chapters have been drafted and council
approved but not membership approved.88 Although the project was on the 2020
Annual Meeting agenda, that meeting was cancelled (no doubt another byproduct of
COVID-19), and while tentative drafts were produced and posted online, no motions
or voting occurred.89
In the meantime, courts have grappled with how to handle the situation when
an updated version of a restatement has been published after a court has already
approved and relied upon a previous version. After reviewing caselaw primarily
focused on the tort arena and the Section 7.07 Restatement provision, the courts’
approaches can be placed into one of four categories: (1) wishy-washy, where it is hard
to tell how a court has resolved the issue; (2) accepting the new version without much
discussion; (3) rejecting the new version with some discussion (the “no” approach, and
we will tell you why); or (4) soundly rejecting a new version (the hell no approach).90
A. The Wishy-Washy Approach
In these cases, although courts included a brief discussion of two versions of
the restatement on the same issue, the courts never satisfactorily resolved the issue of
which one to adopt. For example, in a wrongful death case in Missouri arising from a
radiologist's alleged negligence in conducting a CT scan, the issue was whether the
radiologist was an employee of the defendant hospital at the time.91 The court cited
both the Second and Third Restatements of Agency, in addition to Missouri statutory
law, for how to make this determination.92 Instead of picking one or the other, however,
the court instead came to this vague conclusion: “Because the factors stated in the
Restatement (Third) and the Restatement (Second) are substantially consistent, we
need not endorse one over the other. Rather, we view the list in the Restatement
(Third) simply as a more recent iteration of the same basic principle explained in the
earlier version.”93
Similarly, an Illinois court, addressing whether a carpenter was acting within
the scope of his employment when he injured the plaintiff, set forth the three-part test
in section 228 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency because that is where “Illinois
courts look.”94 But then, in a surprising twist, the court cited to the Third Restatement
of Agency but just concluded that the updated version “states the test in more general
terms, but with essentially the same meaning.”95 Nowhere did the court indicate that

87 Restatement
of
the
Law,
Copyright,
A M.
L.
INST.,
http://www.ali.org/publications/show/copyright/ (last visited Dec. 4, 2020).
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 As should be obvious, these categories are the author’s own creation. No court or other authority
has categorized or classified these decisions in this manner.
91 Jefferson ex rel. Jefferson v. Mo. Baptist Med. Ctr., 447 S.W.3d 701, 704–05 (Mo. Ct. App. 2014).
92 Id. at 709.
93 Id. at 711 n.10.
94 Hoy v. Great Lakes Retail Servs., Inc., 52 N.E.3d 386, 391 (Ill. Ct. App. 2016).
95 Id. at 391 n.1.
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it was moving toward or away from the Second Restatement to the Third Restatement
of Agency.
Finally, the Washington Court of Appeals took a similar approach when it cited
to both Restatements of Agency but did not say whether it would adopt one or the
other.96 There, the issue was whether an employee on a mandated, employer
sanctioned break was within the scope of employment.97 The court, after first stating
the test under Washington law, explained that that test was similar to the test found
in section 228 of the Restatement, so it quoted that test.98 Then, however, it quoted
section 7.07 of the Third Restatement of Agency and stated, “this version is consistent
with the previous one.”99 It then concluded that “Washington courts have applied the
reasoning found in the Restatement” and cited to both the old and new versions.100
In sum, in all of the above cases, as well as others, if you were to opine on
whether the jurisdiction has adopted the Second or Third Restatement of Agency, or
both, there would be no clear right answer.101
B. Yes, We Will Adopt the Updated Version with Little or No Discussion
The second category of cases are those where courts have adopted the Third
Restatement with either little or no discussion.102 For example, the Arizona Supreme
Court expressly adopted section 7.07 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency when
deciding whether an employee was within the course and scope of his employment
when he injured a motorcycle driver after returning from dinner on a business trip.103
Initially, the court noted that its approach to the issue was endorsed by the Second
Restatement of Agency, specifically quoting the factors found in section 228.104 But
then it referenced the Restatement (Third) of Agency and stated that section 7.07
essentially consolidated many different sections of the previous version, and thus, it

Melin-Schilling v. Imm, 205 P.3d 905, 907–08 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009).
Id. at 907.
98 Id at 907–08.
99 Id at 908.
100 Id.
101 See Hass v. Wentzlaff, 816 N.W.2d 96, 103 n.3 (S.D. 2012) (noting that the Restatement
(Second) of Agency has played a prevalent role in the courts’ vicarious liability jurisprudence and that
the Restatement (Third) of Agency, which no party in the case had urged the court to adopt, had
changed the foreseeability inquiry, but the law in South Dakota embodies aspects of both
Restatements in any event.); Kirlin v. Halverson, 758 N.W.2d 436, 456 (S.D. 2008) (Meierhenry, J.,
concurring) (writing that the foreseeability test in section 228 of the Second Restatement for scope of
employment analysis has been revised in section 7.07 of the Third Restatement so the court should
“perhaps consider the approach adopted by the Restatement (Third) of Agency in the future.”); Picher
v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 974 A.2d 286, 296 (Me. 2009) (after stating that Maine looks to
the Second Restatement of Agency and section 228, it then stated: “We express no opinion as to the
applicability of either section 7.07 or section 7.08 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency to the facts of
this case, except to say that on remand, the court may look to these sections.”).
102 Barnett v. Clark, 889 N.E.2d 281, 284 (Ind. 2008) (quoting and appearing to adopt section 7.07
of the Restatement (Third) of Agency.).
103 Engler v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g, 280 P.3d 599, 600 (Ariz. 2012).
104 Id. at 602.
96
97

[20:232 2021]

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

246

agreed that the Restatement (Third) “sets forth the appropriate test . . . and we adopt
it here.”105
C. No, We Will Not Use the Updated Version of the Restatement Provision
The third category of cases are those where courts have opted not to adopt the
Third (Restatement) of Agency. For example, a Delaware court opted not to apply the
Third (Restatement) of Agency “because our State has embraced the Restatement
(Second) of Agency, and § 228 in particular, for decades now, and the . . . test works
well to fairly determine when respondeat superior liability is appropriate.”106 Similarly,
the Tennessee Supreme Court, after a robust discussion of how other jurisdictions have
approached the newer Restatement (Third) of Agency, concluded that the Restatement
(Second) of Agency “provides a more instructive framework” for its analysis and thus
declined to adopt the Restatement (Third) of Agency.107 And finally, the Maine
Supreme Court also decided to stick to the Restatement (Second) of Agency, even
though the Restatement (Third) of Agency was extant because, at the time the dispute
arose, the Second Restatement was operative.108
D. Hell No, We Will Not Adopt Updated Versions of the Restatement
In areas of the law outside of vicarious liability, there is a fourth category of
cases where courts not only refused to adopt an updated version of a restatement but
were brutal in their treatment of the creators of those updates. Some of this criticism
has come from justices on the Supreme Court.109 In fact, Justices Scalia and Thomas
have criticized the Restatements in general—the modern ones especially.110 For his
part, Justice Scalia wrote separately in Kansas v. Nebraska for the sole purpose of
criticizing the modern Restatements, stating as follows:
The object of the original Restatements was ‘to present an orderly
statement of the general common law.’ . . . . Over time, the Restatement
authors have abandoned the mission of describing the law, and have
chosen instead to set forth their aspirations for what the law ought to
be . . . . Restatement sections . . . should be given no weight whatever
as to the current state of the law, and no more weight regarding what
the law ought to be than the recommendations of any respected lawyer
or scholar. And it cannot safely be assumed, without further inquiry,

Id.
Sherman v. State Dep’t of Public Safety, 190 A.3d 148, 169 n.130 (Del. 2018).
107 Hughes v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville, 340 S.W.3d 352, 365 (Tenn. 2011).
108 Spencer v. VIP, Inc., 910 A.2d 366, 367–68 n.1 (Me. 2006).
109 Liu v. SEC, 140 S. Ct. 1936, 1953 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Kansas v. Nebraska, 574
U.S. 445, 475–76 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
110 Liu, 140 S. Ct. at 1953 (Thomas, J., dissenting), Kansas, 574 U.S. at 475–76 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
105
106
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that a Restatement provision describes rather than revises current
law. . . .111
Subsequently, in Liu v. SEC, decided in 2020, Justice Thomas dissented and
not only quoted Justice Scalia’s comments from Kansas v. Nebraska but added his own
views of the Third Restatement of Restitution, stating that the “‘Restatement’ is an
inapt title for this edition of the treatise.”
Further, the United States District Court for New Mexico, quoting Justice
Scalia’s comments in Kansas v. Nebraska about modern Restatements, refused to
adopt the Restatement (Third) of Agency on a matter involving a theory of vicarious
liability.112 The writing was already on the wall that it was not inclined to do so when
the first thing the court said about the Third Restatement was this: “After itself
creating the aided-in-agency theory in 1958, the Restatement of Agency now distances
itself from the theory—more-or-less pretending it never existed.”113 The court then
gave several reasons why the Third Restatement’s change in its theory was of “minimal
importance.”114 First, neither the American Law Institute nor the Restatement “series”
is a “monolithic or continuous institution to which the Court should necessarily ascribe
internally consistent decisionmaking.”115 Second, neither the American Law Institute
nor the Restatement is an “institution” like the Supreme Court that courts must turn
to.116 Third, the Restatement is nothing more than persuasive authority and not very
persuasive at all when it ignores a half-century of precedent.117 Thus, the court
concluded that having brought the aided-in-agency theory into the world, the
Restatement had no right to now take it out.118
Thus, there seem to be a variety of approaches that courts use when deciding
whether to incorporate a new Restatement into its rules after adopting an earlier
version.
VII. ELIMINATION OF TIME AND SPACE LIMITS IN LINE WITH CHANGES IN THE WORKFORCE
AND THE NEW RESTATEMENT—EMPLOYER AND EMPLOYEE PERSPECTIVES
Assuming a dispute arises in a post-COVID world involving a work for hire
issue, as it most certainly will, the question then arises whether the court should adopt
the Third Restatement, and how employers, on the one hand, and employees, on the
other, would be impacted if a court did.
If the time and space factor were no longer considered, this would largely
benefit employers, as it would be one less hurdle for employers to jump when proving
a work is for hire. And employers have legitimate and compelling arguments in their
favor. First, adoption of the Restatement (Third) of Agency, already cited in a Third
Kansas, 574 U.S. at 476–77 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Peña v. Greffet, 110 F. Supp. 3d 1103, 1116 n.4 (D.N.M. 2015) (quoting Justice Scalia’s opinion
in Kansas, 574 U.S. 445 at length.).
113 Id. at 1138.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Id.
117 Peña, 110 F. Supp. 3d at 1139.
118 Id.
111
112
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Circuit work for hire case, does not represent a major shift in precedent. Many courts
have already minimized the importance of the time and space factor, and with the
advent of the Restatement, employers can argue that it is time to make it official.
Second, the realities of the workforce in a post-COVID world (a concern that the
Restatement authors had even pre-COVID-19, at least with respect to a large swath of
the workforce) present even more reason to eliminate a factor already on life support.
In short, it seems apparent that many logical reasons can be constructed in favor of
adopting section 7.07 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency.
On the other hand, employees have equally persuasive arguments for why this
factor should not be eliminated. First, the Restatement (Second) of Agency has been
part of our work for hire jurisprudence since the Supreme Court decided CCNV in
1989, and there is no compelling reason to undo that history until the Supreme Court
says so (and judging by Justice Thomas’s scathing indictment of the Third
Restatement, and the current composition of the Court, the Court does not seem to be
heading in the direction of greeting updated versions of the Restatement with open
arms).
Second, the original aim of the work for hire doctrine was to strike a balance
and compromise between the interests of employers, on the one hand, and interests of
employees, on the other hand. Unlike the doctrine of vicarious liability, where public
policy favors the compensation of injured victims, the policy here was not designed to
have the cards stacked against employees, which elimination of one of three factors
would essentially do. In other words, the delicate balance of equities between
employers and employees would be disturbed.
Third, removal of the time and space factor would certainly deprive all
professional and managerial employees, who are most likely to be able to work from
home—of an important weapon in their arsenal of proof that the work was not work
for hire. Because many of these employees are working from home and may be doing
so long into the future, it would be virtually impossible to create work that was not
deemed for hire if everyone is essentially an employee within the scope of employment
24/7. The only exception to this might be if the work was wholly unrelated to the
employee’s regular job. The cases most likely to reach the point of litigation, however,
would be the close cases where the work was arguably within the scope of the
employee’s job description and duties.
For example, assume an attorney is charged with ensuring that the office
meets all deadlines in an efficient way. To achieve this goal, the attorney hires a
consultant to select software and train people on it. The lawyer then buys separate
software that is purchased on an employer-supplied computer at home (because the
lawyer is working remotely at all times because of COVID-19), and after the lawyer is
done with work for the office, the attorney creates a case management system that
other law firms could use. This case management system, like the lawyer’s other work,
is created at home. If the time and space factor is abandoned, would the employer own
it? Probably. While a court might find that the lawyer was not charged with the duty
of a creating a software program, this result is not guaranteed, and certainly a case
management program would benefit the lawyer’s employer. However, when a similar
scenario arose in 1997, the court held that the work was not a work for hire in part
because the lawyer created the program “outside the authorized time and space limits
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of his job.”119 Specifically, the lawyer designed the software package “at home” on his
own time using a software package that he bought with his own money.120 And, with
regard to the third factor, whether the employee developed the program in part to serve
the interests of his employer, the court agreed that he did.121 Thus, the court held that
the work was not for hire, a result that would not necessarily be reached if courts
abandoned the time and space factor.
Fourth, such a result would not only harm professional and managerial
employees, but other types of employees. For example, take a motorcycle parts designer
who is now working from home because of COVID-19. Assume this designer sends a
logo for an electric scooter to a company that manufactures electric scooters and does
so after hours (assume the employee is only obligated to work until 5). Would that logo
be a work for hire? Probably. Designing logos is the kind of work the employee was
hired to do, the logo might benefit the company because it could be placed on
motorcycles too, and it would not matter whether the work was done at home or after
hours.122 Thus, this is another scenario where the result might change if the time and
space factor is abandoned.
One solution to the problem that would be consistent with the compromise
purpose of the work for hire is to eliminate the time and space factor but place the
burden squarely on the employer’s shoulders to prove the remaining two elements now
expressed in section 7.07 of the Restatement (Third) of Agency. They should be treated
as elements, instead of factors, so that both need to be proven. Thus, the employer
would have to prove that the “performing work was assigned by the employer” and that
the employee did not “serve any purpose of the employer.”123 In addition, courts should
give great weight to an employee’s stated intention in creating the work, evidence that
courts have already taken into account in a work-for-hire determination.124
VIII. CONCLUSION
In the work for hire world, the fact is that there are no injured victims and no
good vs. evil from a moral standpoint. While employers most likely have more
resources to litigate copyright disputes than employees, if employers invest time and
119 Quinn v. City of Detroit, 988 F. Supp. 1044, 1051 (E.D. Mich. 1997). While the court also found
that this work was not of the kind the lawyer was hired to perform, one could imagine that a court
could have gone the other way, and factual scenarios could arise where the issue is grayer because the
job description and the skills involved in the creation of the work are similar.
120 Id.
121 Id. at 1051–52.
122 These facts are loosely based on the facts in Kuryakyn Holdings, LLC v. Ciro, LLC, 242 F.
Supp. 3d 789, 804 (W.D. Wis. 2017). In Kuryakyn, the court held that a snake logo design was not a
work for hire and not within authorized time and space limits because the logo was created on the
employee’s laptop at home, and the e-mails containing the design were sent well after his workday
ended at 5:00 p.m.
123 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) of AGENCY, § 7.07 (AM. L. INST. 2006).
124 See City of Newark v. Beasley, 883 F. Supp. 3, 9 (D.N.J. 1995) (holding that a police officer
was not motivated by a desire to serve his employer because he hoped the materials would be used by
a number of different cities, not just the city he worked for); Roeslin v. Dist. of Columbia, 921 F. Supp.
793, 798–99 (D.D.C. 1995) (even though the system “benefitted his employer,” the court nonetheless
concluded that the employee was “primarily motivated by self-fulfilling purposes.”).
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money into their employees, and employees use that talent to produce works within
the scope of employment, employers should be able to reap the benefits of the resulting
intellectual property. On the other hand, just because someone works for someone else
should not mean that any creation or work that uses the talent the employer saw in
the first place should belong to the employer. It remains to be seen whether litigants
urge the courts to adopt a new test for a work for hire, and if so, how courts will
respond. In the meantime, if a new Restatement on Copyright is published that
addresses the issue, as would be expected, it will be interesting to see what that
provides and if courts turn to that instead.

